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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Alley was charged with the manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance,
to wit: "spice" and/or "potpourri." R. 000032 to 000036 (Indictment). It was alleged that Mr.
Alley's manufacturing and distribution ran from November 2011 through September 2011. R.
000134 to 000170 (Affidavit for Search Warrant). During the time that Mr. Alley was engaged in
the practice of manufacturing and selling "spice", the law in Idaho was in flux. R. at 000097 to
000103.
On October 15, 2010 Governor Otter signed into law a rule promulgated by the Idaho
Board of Pharmacy in the previous month. Id. The rule made it illegal to possess, manufacture,
or distribute some chemicals that had been used to make "spice." Id. Those chemicals were: CP
47,497, HU-210, JWH-018, JWH-073, JWH-200, JWH-081, and JWH-250. Id. The Board of
Pharmacy rule remained in effect until March 10, 2011, when House Bill 139 was signed into
law by Governor Otter and took immediate effect. Id. at 000102 to 000103. Whereas the Board
of Pharmacy Rule prohibited chemicals by name, HB 139 prohibited substances by describing
groups of chemicals, and further prohibited certain chemical alterations to the prohibited
chemicals. Compare R. at 0000098 to R. at 000172 to 000176.
In between the time the Board of Pharmacy promulgated its rule and the time HB 139
was signed into law, many in the "spice" industry began looking for chemicals that would be
compliant with the language contained in HB 139. R. at 000094. The language of HB 139 was
available, and prior to its passage the language was passed along to Dr. Richard Parent along
with a list of potential chemical candidates for use in "spice." Id. After comparing the language
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of the bill with the chemical structures of the list provided to him, Dr. Parent was able to
determine that some chemicals were not covered by the language ofHB 139. Id. Specifically, Dr.
Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered by the language. R. at 000109 to 000110.
This information soon became common knowledge throughout Idaho, and many spice
products began using AM-2201 even before March 10, 2011. To ensure compliance with the
law, many manufacturers and distributors would get their base chemicals tested to ensure that
they were not "dirty" (i.e. containing chemicals covered under HB 139). See id. This had to be
done since one cannot tell by simply looking at a chemical what the chemical is, just as one
cannot look at a "spice" product and know with what, if any, chemical or chemicals the plant
matter has been treated. As with many others in the industry, Mr. Alley was actively engaged in
the practice of testing chemicals shipped to him to ensure those chemicals did not contain
prohibited substances. R. at 000134 to 000170.
Mr. Alley was not accused of possessing and/or distributing anything illegal prior to the
implementation of HB 139. R. 000032 to 000036; 000134 to 000170. The primary instances of
distribution were samples of "spice" taken and/or purchased at various times throughout
September 2011. Id. Specifically, the product involved is a brand called Twizted Potpourri. Id.
The State ultimately came into possession of three different products from the Twizted Potpourri
line: Fire, Ultra Hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. 000161. Those samples were obtained through
dumpster diving and controlled buys. R. at 000150 to 000155 and 000161.
Of the samples tested, a total of three different chemicals were identified by the State as
alleged controlled substances R. at 000154 to 000155 and 000166 to 000167. On September 13,
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2011, some product was taken from a dumpster and some of it was tested. R. at 000150 to
000156. It appears the seized product was potentially a part of the Twizted Potpourri line but it
is not clear which sub-product it was intended to be (i.e. Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, or Blueberry). See
id. That sample was sent in for testing on September 14, 2011 and found to contain AM-2201

and JWH-210. Id. Another sample obtained via dumpster diving on September 12, 2011 was
ultimately found to contain only AM-2201. R. at 000148 to 000156. That product was identified
as Fire Twizted Potpourri. Id.
Finally, on September 26, 2011 a controlled buy was made in which the State took
control of one sample each of Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. at 000159 to 000162. Each
sample was tested. R. at 000167.

Fire was confirmed to contain only AM-2201 as was

Blueberry. Id. Ultra Hypnotic was tested as containing JWH-019. Id. The end result is that it
appears from the State's evidence that only two samples have ever contained anything other than
AM-2201, with one sample containing JWH-210 and the other JWH-019.
The State believes that AM-2201 is a controlled substance and makes no distinction
between AM-2201 and other prohibited substances. The Defendant disagrees and thus filed his
motion to dismiss based on the contention that AM-2201 was legal in the State in ofldaho at the
time he possessed it. R. at 000079 to 000176. The Idaho Legislature amended the relevant statute
in 2012 and struck the language at issue in the present case and replaced it with the language "to
any extent." 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 181 (hereinafter HB 502). Had the language used in HB 502
been in effect at the time of Mr. Alley's possession he would concede the language included
chemicals such as AM-2201. Nevertheless, the entirety of Mr. Alley's conduct was prior to the
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passage of HB 502 and in fact Mr. Alley's case may have been a driving factor in the
Legislature's decision to amend the language of the statute.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Defendant presented expert testimony from two
doctors of organic chemistry. They both testified that AM-2201 has a structure that substantially
differs from the structures prohibited by Idaho Code 37 § 2705(d)(30)(a), and thus, is not a
controlled substance under Idaho Law.
Specifically, Dr. Owen McDougal testified, "The chain itself [in AM-2201] is an alkyl
halide. So it has the fluorine as a functional group off of the hydrocarbon chain. In the statute it
specifies an alkyl group. Alkyl groups are nothing but carbon and hydrogen. When you add a
halogen or some other hetero atom, like oxygen or nitrogen [or fluorine], you create functionality
in the molecule, and it becomes a different class of compound." Tr. of Hearing on Motion to
Dismiss, pp 39-40 (emphasis added).

Likewise, Dr. DeJesus testified that AM-2201 has a

"flouro-alkane chain" and is thus not an alkyl group, see Tr. pp. 118 to 125, and that, "[I]n the
case of substitution other than carbon, such as the one that we are dealing with in this case right
here [AM-2201], it then becomes another functional group. It is no longer an alkyl group." Tr.
pp. 131.
Despite this testimony, the District Court denied the motion on the basis that in passing
HB 139, the legislature intended to ban chemicals used in "spice", that is, those that mimic the
"hallucinatory effects" of marijuana. R. at 000308. The District Court turned to legislative intent
without having ever found any portion of the statute to be vague, ambiguous, or in conflict with
other law. R. at 297-318. Furthermore, the District Court interpreted the legislative intent as
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applying to the pharmacological effects of certain substances without regard to actions of the
legislature suggesting precisely the opposite. Id.
Based on the concerns Mr. Alley had with the decision as issued by the District Court Mr.
Alley filed a Motion to Reconsider. R. at 334-63. The District Court ruled from the bench on the
motion and upheld its prior decision on the same grounds and reasoning as set forth in the
written decision. R. at 379. As a result of the findings and conclusions of the District Court Mr.
Alley entered a conditional plea of guilty. R. at 447-49.
Mr. Alleys conditional plea was based on the Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See
R. at 000297 to 000318. It is Mr. Alley's position that the District Court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss and his subsequent motion reconsider, because Idaho Code § 2705(d)(30)(a)
(2011) did not prohibit the possession, manufacturing, or distribution of the chemical AM-2201.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

On appeal, Defendant argues that the judgment of conviction should be overturned
because the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was in error. Defendant maintains:
(1) AM-2201 was not prohibited by the relevant statutory language in place at the time of the
alleged offense (which has since been amended to be broader and now unarguably prohibits AM2201 ), specifically:
a) The district court improperly turned to legislative intent in interpreting Idaho Code §
2705(d)(30)(a);
b) The district court's improperly considered the alleged effects of AM-2201 rn
interpreting § 2705( d)(30)( a);
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c) § 2705(d)(30)(a) is not ambiguous and does not prohibit AM-2201; and
d) In the alternative, to the extent§ 2705(d)(30)(a) is ambiguous, the district court should
have applied the rule of lenity, and if it had done so, it should have concluded that
2705(d)(30)(a) does not prohibit AM-2201.
(2) that the interpretation afforded LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a) by the district court renders it
unconstitutionally vague.
ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court incorrectly determined that AM-2201 is prohibited by I.C. § 372705{d)(30)
The question of whether a substance is designated in the Controlled Substance Act as a
controlled substance is a question of law for the court. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 262
(1980); State v. Kellog, 102 Idaho 628 (1981). As such, appellate review is de nova. See State v.

Doe, 92 P. 3d 521, 523-24; 140 Idaho 271 (2004).
A. The Court improperly resorted to examining legislative history without first
determining whether the statutory language was ambiguous.
In interpreting statutory language, a court must give the words their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning. Where statutory language is not ambiguous, the court should not consult

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151

legislative history or other extrinsic evidence.

Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (citing City ofSun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho
665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). In its order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment, the District Court judge cited the language in Verska prohibiting it from resorting to
legislative history if it determined the statute's plain language was unambiguous.
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Despite its correct recitation of the law with regard to statutory interpretation, the District
Court then proceeded to resort to legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended LC.

§ 37-2705(d)(30) to prohibit AM-2201. The Court's reliance on legislative intent is evidenced by
the Court's framing of the issue when it asked, "what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule
I?" R. at 300 and 304. The Court then turned to the entirety of I.C. § 37-2705(d) and concluded
that "[b]y stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly ease to
discern the intention of the legislature[.]" R. at 306. Other language evidencing the Court's
reliance on the legislative intent includes, "[t]he minutes of the legislative committees," "the
Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule
I..." and "[i]t was the intent of the legislature." R. at 308 (emphasis added).
Based on the legislative history, the Court concluded that the legislature "unambiguously
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and did so in broad language that
encompasses AM-2201." R. at 307-08. That is, the District Court ultimately concluded that the
statute was unambiguous, but reached its conclusion that the language in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)
prohibiting "THC 'and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar
chemical structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the
hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" by resorting to legislative history.
Accordingly, the District Court erred in resorting to legislative history first, and then
using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous language of the statute prohibited
AM-2201.
What is more is that in making its analysis the District Court omitted any discussion of,
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or consideration for, other acts of the legislature when passing HB 139. Specifically, the removal
of certain language from the relevant section of the code. The language that was removed looked
expressly at the pharmacological effects of a substance. The remaining language referred only to
the structural elements of the substance in question.
The version of Idaho Code § 37-2705(d)(30) that was m place prior to the 2011
legislative passage of House Bill 139 read:
Tetrahydrocannabinols. Synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the
plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances,
derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure and pharmacological
activity such as the following:
LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30)(2010)(emphasis added).
The 2011 House Bill 139 that added subsection (ii)(a), which was the subject of the
arguments before this Court, also

removed from LC.

§ 37-2705(d)(30)

the term

"pharmacological activity" so that it now reads:
Tetrahydrocannabinols--or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant,
or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives,
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:
LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(201 l)(emphasis added).
The removal of the language "pharmacological activity" is quite telling as it creates a
plain reading of the statute that does not take into consideration the pharmacological or
hallucinogenic effects a given substance may have. A plain reading of the relevant section of
statute now requires looking solely at the structural elements of a substance in determining if it
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contained within the purview of the statute.
Indeed, the removal of the pharmacological reference in subsection (30) makes the statute
more consistent with the language being added under subsection (30) in that all of the language
contained in the subsections of (30) is entirely structural related. Those subsections, such as
subsection (30)(a)--the subsection in question in the present case--describe naphthyls, indoles,
nitrogen atoms on the indole ring, alkyls, alkenyls, cycloalkylmethyls, and cycloalkylethyls. All
of those describe structures and not pharmacological effects of a given substance. Even more
compelling is considering how fme a point is placed on the structural descriptions. The sole
difference between an alkyl and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between
two carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. The only difference between the cycloalkylmethyls and
cycloalkylethyls is the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms present. Tr. at 43:2-44:3.
For the legislature to break down structural descriptions to the point of discerning between a
single bond and double bond or a single carbon atom is indicative of a severe focus on structure
and not effect.
The result is that while the district court should not have considered the legislative history
in reaching its conclusion even where it did consider such history it did not account for the
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and extreme focus on
structure. For both reasons the district court's decision was improper and should be overturned.
B. The Court's determination that I.C. § 37-2705(d) prohibits all "synthetic
substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" was error.

The proper procedure would have been to begin by examining the plain language of LC.
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§ 37-2705(d)(30), which defines tetrahydrocannabinol, "synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis," and, as relevant here,
"synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure [to THC]" as
Schedule I drugs. Had the District Court followed this procedure, it would not have concluded
that the statute prohibits all "synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of
marijuana," because the statutory language states that it is prohibiting substances with "similar
chemical structure" to tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the primary psychoactive chemical in
marijuana) and other synthetic equivalents of the chemicals contained in marijuana.
The District Court reached its erroneous conclusion by determining that, in enacting LC.
§ 37-2705(d)(30), the legislature was attempting to prohibit "spice" (plant matter combined with

chemicals that have similar effects to THC or marijuana), and concluding that the list of
prohibited chemical structures following the language "such as" in LC. § 37-2705(d)(30) was
provided merely by way of example and thus could not narrow the language preceding the words
"such as."
The District Court was correct in concluding that the plain meaning of "such as" is that
whatever list follows, it is non-exhaustive.

However, the fact that the statute does not

specifically list every chemical it prohibits does not render the list meaningless. In determining
the meaning of a statute, courts must give effect to all the words of the statute so that none will
be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant. Hillside Landscape Const., Inc. v. City ofLewiston,
151 Idaho 749, 264 P.3d 388 (2011) (citing State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,
309 (2006)). Presumably, the legislature did not expend time and resources drafting a list of
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prohibited chemicals idly, but rather to instruct the courts as to what it meant by "similar
chemical structure." See Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 963 P.2d 1168, 131 Idaho 731 (1998) (nonexhaustive list added to statute by amendment "clarified the language" of the statute).
Moreover, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, non-exhaustive lists can and,
indeed, do narrow the general language they explain. See State v. Cobb, 969 P.2d 244, 132
Idaho 195 (1998) (disturbing the peace ordinance survived constitutional vagueness challenge
because it included a non-exclusive list of examples of proscribed conduct). It is a rule of
statutory construction that "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or
things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class
or character to those specifically enumerated." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850,
854 (2001). According to this rule, to determine whether AM-2201 was included within the
general term "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure
[to THC]," the District Court should have considered whether AM-2201 is of a like or similar
class, character, and severity to those classes of chemical structures specifically enumerated.

See, e.g., State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087, 139 Idaho 482 (2003) (criminal statute using a
non-exclusive list does not prohibit conduct of similar class and character but lesser severity);

Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 684 P. 2d 268, 106 Idaho 866 (1984) (non-exhaustive list of
recreational activities that included "pleasure driving" also encompassed motorcycling for
pleasure because it was sufficiently similar to the activities listed).
Further, the examples included in a non-exhaustive list can also narrow the definition of
another listed example. In Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd, 159 P.3d 896, 901 (Idaho
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2007), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether email correspondence
between a public employee and her supervisor was covered by the personnel records exemption
from disclosure under the state's public records act. The act did not define "personnel records"
but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of exempt personnel records. Although one of the
listed examples was "correspondence" and the Court acknowledged that the emails were a type
of correspondence, it held that "in context, it becomes clear that . . . only those types of
correspondence typically found in a personnel file [are exempt] ... [the emails] are informal
communications

between an

employee

and

her

supervisor,

unrelated to

personnel

administration." Id. at 902. That is, even though "correspondence" was specifically included in
a non-exclusive list, the Court held that, in context, the meaning of "correspondence" was
narrowed by the other items included in the list.
Here, the District Court refused to undertake this analysis.

Rather, it improperly

examined the legislative history to determine that the statute was intended to "deal with the socalled 'spice' problem" and thus interpreted the general language as prohibiting all substances
that could have similar hallucinatory effects to marijuana, regardless of their lack of similarity to
the chemical structures listed in the statute with regard to structure or potency. Rather than
engage in the kind of statutory interpretation required by Idaho's case law, the District Court
rendered the legislature's non-exhaustive list meaningless.
Indeed, the non-exhaustive list provided in the code includes subsections (a) through (i),
most of which contained yet another list within them. For example, subsection (a) contains a
subset list of "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." As
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with any other words in the statute these words too, must be given effect and cannot be rendered
superfluous or meaningless.
Nevertheless, the district court's opinion does not consider itself with the meaning and
application of those terms or what purpose they serve in the overall application of the statute. Yet
they do serve a purpose, That purpose is to place context and limits to the applicability of the
statute. Those words denote very specific chemical structures that are intended to fall within the
purview of the statute. In short, they define the scope of the statute.
Where a chemical falls outside of the type and nature being described by those terms it by
definition falls outside of the list of chemicals expressly covered in the statute. As noted by Dr.
McDougal, the chemical AM-2201 does not just fall outside of the scope of chemicals described
in subsection (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is in a different "class" altogether. Tr. at 39:9-40:6. It is this
structural separation between AM-2201 and the chemicals described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) that places
AM-2201 outside of the scope of the statute and therefore legal under the law in effect at the
time. Because the district court looked solely to similarity in pharmacological effect and
disregards the limiting nature of the structural descriptions in the statute the decision of the
district court should be reversed.
C. AM-2201 is not included among the substances prohibited by I.C. § 37-2705(d)

A correct statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that AM-2201 is not a prohibited
substance. As noted by the District Court, LC. § 37-2705(d)(30), unlike other sections of LC. §
37-2705, does not prohibit specific chemicals. Rather, it prohibits "[t]etrahydrocannabinols or
synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in . . . Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic
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substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:"
There are two subsections, the first of which prohibits THC and its optical isomers, and the
second of which prohibits "the following synthetic drugs" and then lists in each of its subsubsections "any compound structurally derived from" one of six chemicals "by substitution at
the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or
not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent."
In the present context the "non-exhaustive" list is exceptionally narrow. The differences
between the examples are the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms (cycloalkylmethyl or
cycloalkylethyl), the number of bonds between carbon atoms (alkenyls), and the length of a
hydrogen and carbon chain (alkyls). LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a). All the examples hinge around
differences in chemical chains containing only hydrogen and carbon. Consequently, at the
molecular level, all non-hydrogen and carbon chains fall outside the list. Otherwise, one would
expect that the list would have covered non-hydrogen and carbon type substituents. 1 Due to the
highly technical, specific, and minute distinctions between the examples this Court should take
great caution in applying the "such as" language beyond the types of examples provided. AM2201 is not of the type listed because it contains a non-hydrogen and carbon atom substituent.
It should be noted here that the district court never made any findings as whether AM-

1

The code was amended in 2012 to accomplish precisely this, as it removed the language limiting
the examples to alkyls, alkenyls, etc., and replaced that language with "to any extent," thereby
including all possible constituents in the example list. Compare LC. § 37-3705(d)(30)(a) (2011)
and 37-2705(d)(30)(a) (2012).
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2201 was expressly covered by the language in (d)(30)(ii)(a). The district court rested almost
entirely on the language contained in (d)(30) and on its conclusions that AM-2201 allegedly
exhibits pharmacological effects similar to THC. As such, to the extent this Court addresses the
issue of whether AM-2201 is described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is doing so independent of the
conclusions of the district court.
D. To the extent the statute is ambiguous as to whether AM-2201 is prohibited, the
rule of lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Defendants' favor.

The rule of lenity, as applied to criminal statutes, requires that any ambiguity should be
strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App.
1998); see also Capital Care Ctr. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776,
(1997). In construing statutory language in the criminal code, the court in Herrera-Brito held
that "[a]n act cannot be held criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears from the language
used that the legislature so intended." Id. at 387 (emphasis supplied). The order of the language
in that quote is essential to the proper application of the rule of lenity. The Court should not look
to, or apply, legislative intent. Rather, the language of the statute itself must make evident the
intent of the legislature to criminalize the specific conduct of the accused.
This distinction is further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
[w]hile the appellant may be correct that it was the legislative intent to deter not only a
person who actually possesses a gun, but all principals involved in a crime in which a
dangerous weapon was employed, we cannot make such an interpretation for the
legislature when no such intention appears from the language of the statute. To hold
otherwise would be supplying what the legislature left vague and this we cannot do.
State v. Morrison, 143 Idaho 459, 461 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Thompson, 101
Idaho 430, 438 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
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Indeed, in Morrison the Court of Appeals found that the legislative history supported the State' s
position but concluded it was bound by the "admonition in Thompson that the intention of the
statute must appear in its language" in order to comport with the rule of lenity. Morrison, 143
Idaho at 461.
Any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the Defendant. See also
McNally v. US., 483 U.S. 350 (1987). To the extent the District Court relied upon extrinsic

evidence of legislative intent to determine the legal status of AM-2201, it has essentially already
implicitly concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous in this regard. The District Court's
failure to explicitly recognize this ambiguity and to construe it in favor of the Defendant was
error.
II. As applied to Defendants, I.C. § 37-2705(d) is void for vagueness

In the alternative, Defendant submits that the statute is void for vagueness. Where the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, appellate review is de novo. State v. Korsen, 138
Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.
App. 2009).
A criminal defendant asserting an argument that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
bears the burden of overcoming a rebuttable presumption of statutory validity. State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 711 (2003). To meet his burden and overcome the presumption, a defendant can
show either that the statute failed to provide fair notice of what conduct is illegal or that the
statute failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police lacked appropriate guidelines in
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the statute's enforcement. Id.
Vague statutes violate the due process rights of an individual under the federal
constitution as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, and also violate the due process
rights of Idahoans under the Idaho Constitution. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) and City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347 (1956). Typically, a statute that "either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning, and differ as to its application" is unconstitutionally vague.
Capital Care Center v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776, (1997)

(internal citations omitted). In the case of a criminal statute, there is less tolerance for vague
language than what might otherwise be permitted under a "civil or non-criminal statute." Id.
(citing Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 716 (1990)). Indeed, when analyzing a civil or
non-criminal statute, the language is not impermissibly vague so long as "persons of ordinary
intelligence can derive 'core meaning' from them." Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho
346, 354 (2005). Perhaps this is because it has long been recognized that "in most English words
and phrases there lurk uncertainties." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585 (1990)(citing Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975)).

However, noticeably absent from the vagueness test for criminal statutes is the "core
meaning" element. Compare Capital Care Center, 129 Idaho at 776 and Kolar, 142 Idaho at
354. It is not enough in the criminal context that the party accused of a criminal act should have
understood the "core meaning" of the statute. Rather, the language must be sufficiently clear so
that the accused should have known the precise conduct being prohibited or mandated.
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Therefore, when it comes to criminal statutes, there can be little tolerance of the "uncertainties"
that "lurk" in "word and phrases" of the English language.
In the criminal context, a statute must provide "fair warning of the conduct that it makes
a crime" such that the conduct punished as criminal (here, possession of the chemical AM-2201)
is "plainly and unmistakably" within the provisions of a statute. State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.3d 1083,
139 Idaho 482 (2003). So far as possible, to comport with due process requirements, criminal
statutes must draw a clear line and provide "fair warning ... in language that the common world
will understand" what the law intends to do if that line is crossed. Id. (citing United States v.

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1224, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997)).
Here, not only can the "common world" not understand which chemicals are prohibited
under the statute, experts in the field of organic chemistry do not understand where the line is
drawn.
Defendant presented the testimony of two highly qualified experts in the field in Dr.
McDougal and Dr. De Jesus. Tr. pp. 29 to 174. Each has significant experience and education in
the field of organic chemistry. Id., see also R. 000187 to 000198. Both experts concluded that
AM-2201 is not described under the statute. See id., see also R. 000354 to 000363. Moreover,
Defendant did not contact numerous experts and then pick only the ones that agreed with his
position. The Defendant selected the experts based upon their qualifications and had each
independently analyze AM-2201 under the statute. Defendant's experts unanimously concluded
that AM-2201 was not described under the statute.
The State elicited expert testimony from a State lab technician (employed by the State
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and under the direction of the State Police) who testifed that an "alkyl" is inclusive of
"haloalkyls." The Defendant posits that this because the State is unable to find anyone with a
doctorate level of education and unaffiliated with the State who would agree with the position of
Mr. Sincerbeaux, the State's expert, who holds only a Bachelor's degree and is a longtime
employee of the State.
Regardless, it is apparent from the conflicting expert testimony presented in this case that
the statute fails to provide clear warning of what is prohibited, even to experts. Certainly,
individuals of common intelligence could conclude that because the substitutions listed as
prohibited are all comprised entirely of carbon and hydrogen atoms, substitution by haloalkyl is
not prohibited because haloalkyls include adding entirely different types of atoms (fluorine).
A disagreement between experts does not inherently make a law vague, but it is relevant

to a determination of vagueness because the vagueness test itself asks how a person of common
intelligence would view the statute. Consequently, where even experts cannot agree on the
meaning of the language in a statute, one cannot expect that lay persons would be able to
determine what is and is not intended to be prohibited with any reasonable accuracy.
Likewise, although a subsequent clarifying amendment is not conclusive in a vagueness
analysis, it is relevant to that analysis that the Idaho legislature has already taken steps to clarify
and correct for the confusion created by the initial language in the statute. In the 2012 legislative
session I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) was amended to read,
Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or IH-indol-3- yl-(1naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl,
alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2 (4 morpholinyl)ethyl to any extent,
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whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not
substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.2
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) 2012 (emphasis and strikethrough added).
While the language "to any extent" is certainly more broad then the language it replaced
it nevertheless goes a long way in making the statute clear. As amended, individuals are placed
on notice that any substituent, irrespective of whether it is alkyl, haloalkyl, or one of the many
other variants, is prohibited. There is no question that this language includes the chemical AM2201.
Even if the vagueness in the statutory language does not nse to the level of
unconstitutionality, Judge Greenwood's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting any substance
with similar "hallucinatory effects" to marijuana introduces unconstitutional vagueness,
especially given that the effects of chemicals in the human body cannot be determined based
solely on the chemical structures of the compounds. State v. Doe, 92 P.3d 521, 140 Idaho 271
(2004) (statute that may not be facially overbroad or void for vagueness may nonetheless
interpreted in a manner that renders it unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); State v. Richards,
896 P.2d 357, 127 Idaho 31 (Ct. Appeals 1995) (infirmity for vagueness may be avoided by
interpreting the statute in a manner that comports with constitutional limitations).
Also relevant is that Defendant made a good faith effort to comply with Idaho law.

2

This was the language used in the federal law recently passed and was the model language
recommended for some time. For some unknown reason Idaho elected not to use the model
language and instead chose to list specific substituents. Only after the hearing in State v. Alley
did the State reevaluate the language and amended the language to match the model language
and make the law clear.
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Defendant retained experts in organic chemistry to interpret the law, and tested "spice" to ensure
that chemicals that were clearly prohibited, such as JWH-018, were not present. Although a
good faith subjective belief that conduct is

n~t

illegal is not a defense to illegal action, it is

relevant to establishing that reasonable people would necessarily disagree as to what the statute
prohibited, and, thus, that the statute's lack of clarity presents a due process concern, at least
insofar as whether substitution by haloalkyl is prohibited.
CONCLUSION

The judgment of conviction entered in this case should be VACATED, because it was
based on Defendant's plea of guilty, which was conditional upon the District Court's denial of
Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on an error of law. Specifically, the District
Court erred in determining that AM-2201 was, at the relevant time, a controlled substance under
Idaho law. Specifically, the court erred by examining legislative history without first finding a
statutory ambiguity, by resorting to the alleged effects of AM-2201 rather than limiting its
analysis to the chemical's structure, and by either failing to correctly interpret the statute's
unambiguous language or, in the alternative, failing to apply the rule of lenity to interpret
ambiguous language in Defendant's favor. In the alternative, to the extent that the statute can be
interpreted as prohibiting AM-2201, it is void for vagueness.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of March, 2013.

Ryan Holdaway
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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